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THE MENTALLY RETARDED-A QUASI-SUSPECT CLASS?:
CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER V. CITY OF -CLEBURNE
In recent years, the mentally retarded have been increasingly deinstitu-
tionalized.1 One major factor responsible for this trend has been the ac-
ceptance of the theory of normalization, which proposes that mentally re-
tarded individuals must be exposed to normal life patterns and conditions
in order to develop their full potential.2 Mental health officials have at-
tempted to implement normalization by the relocation of the mentally
retarded into group homes.3 The group home format offers the benefits of
family living through the placement of small groups of mentally retarded
individuals into homes in residential areas.
The use of group homes has resulted in an explosion of litigation on
behalf of the mentally retarded.4 Cleburne Living Center v. City of
Cleburne,5 a recent decision from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, reflects the problems encountered when the mentally retarded at-
tempt to reenter a society which is laden with stereotypical attitudes and
prejudices against them.
This comment will consider the degree to which mentally retarded per-
sons, as a group, merit special judicial protection under the equal protec-
tion clause.7 The development by the Supreme Court of an intermediate
level of scrutiny will be examined, to show that the Court generally ap-
plies a heightened level of scrutiny to laws which discriminate against a
class with certain characteristics. This comment will then identify those
1. Guernsey, The Mentally Retarded and Private Restrictive Covenants, 25 WM. & MARY
L. RE V. 421 (1984). Congress has mandated the concept of deinstitutionalization in a series
of statutes designed to encourage community living arrangements and services for persons
with developmental disabilities. See The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1982).
2. See Glenn, The Least Restrictive Alternative in Residential Care and the Principle of
Normalization, in THE PRESmENT'S COMMITTEm ON MENTAL RETARDATON, THE MENTALLY
RETARDED CMzEN AND THE LAW 499 (1976) [hereinafter cited as PRESmENT'S CommrF].
3. Bogin, Group Homes for Persons with Handicaps: Recent Developments in the Law, 5
W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 423 (1983).
4. Wald, Basic Personal and Civil Rights, in PRESmENT'S COMMrrrE, supra note 2, at 3
("With an increasing acceptance of the principle of 'normalization,' future litigation proba-
bly will involve rights to community services ... [and] also deal with the legal, personal,
and civil rights of these special people as they move out into the community.").
5. 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 427 (1984).
6. For example, at issue in Cleburne Living Center was a zoning ordinance that accorded
different treatment to mentally retarded individuals because they were allegedly more dis-
ruptive or dangerous than non-mentally retarded individuals. Id. at 201.
7. The question of which equal protection standard to apply to the mentally retarded is
one of first impression. Id. at 196.
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criteria which historically have triggered heightened scrutiny, and which
should guide the Court's analysis of a classification based upon mental
retardation. Finally, this comment will examine the Cleburne Living
Center decision,8 which attributes a "quasi-suspect" classification to the
mentally retarded, and would apply intermediate scrutiny to any law
which discriminates against that class.
I. BACKGROUND TO Cleburne: AN EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that
"[n]o State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." The intent behind this clause is to prevent legis-
latures from treating similarly situated people or activities
discriminatorily. 10
In the creation and application of laws, governments often categorize
individuals sharing a personal trait for the purpose of imposing a burden
on or providing a benefit to those individuals. Legislative categories are
used to address problems in gross rather than requiring individual deter-
minations based upon the merits of each case. By identifying those per-
sonal traits which a single group may have in common, a government can
effectuate its intended purpose through the incorporation of the personal
trait into legislation."
The legislature has often used the characteristic of mental retardation
as convenient shorthand for the purpose of obtaining a governmental ob-
jective. 12 Equal protection of the law, however, demands that governmen-
8. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. See L. TRIBE, AmmiCAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 991-93 (1978). The Supreme Court has
never interpreted this provision to require that a statute treat every person identically in all
circumstances. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) ("The Constitution does not re-
quire things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were
the same.") (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)); United States v. Horton,
601 F.2d 319, 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979) ("Equal protection is the
guarantee that similar people will be dealt with in a similar manner and that people of
different circumstances will not be treated as if they were the same.").
11. For example, assume the intended purpose of a law is to maintain discipline in a bar
and that women, unlike men, are unable to prevent disturbances of the peace. The govern-
ment can effectuate its intended purpose, i.e., maintaining the peace, by incorporating the
common personal trait (female) into a law which allows men but not women to be bartend-
ers. The law then burdens a particular group which shares the common characteristic of
being female. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Clery, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a law which denied
bartender's licenses to all women except the wives or daughters of male owners of bars),
criticized in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (where a gender-based differential in a state
law prohibiting sale of alcohol to males under 21 and females under 18, was found to violate
equal protection).
12. By equating mental retardation with the characteristics of dependency, irresponsibil-
ity, and dangerousness, a lawmaking body can simplify its statutes. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
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tal distinctions between individuals be based only upon those personal
traits which identify individuals in terms of a meritorious or blameworthy
character.13 In applying the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to such classification-based statutes, courts have used differ-
ing levels of review' 4 depending upon the basis of the classification, the
nature of the interest impaired by the classification, and the state inter-
ests offered in support of the classification. 5 The threshold consideration
of any equal protection claim is, then, the determination of the applicable
standard of review.
A. Standards of Judicial Review Under the Equal Protection Clause
Traditionally," there have been two standards of review for equal pro-
tection claims.' 7 The first standard of review, the rational basis test, re-
quires that the governmental classification bear any rational relationship
to a governmental purpose that is not prohibited by the Constitution.'5
Legislation is rarely invalidated under the rational basis test because the
922(h)(4) (1982) ("It shall be unlawful for any person who has been adjudicated as a mental
defective or who has been committed to any mental institution to receive any firearm
13. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) ("[The basic con-
cept of our system [is] that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual re-
sponsibility or wrongdoing.").
14. The ultimate conclusion as to whether a statutory classification meets the equal pro-
tection guarantee depends largely upon the degree of review exercised by the judiciary. The
court has the option of either deferring or independently determining the appropriateness of
the legislature's choice of goals and the relationship of the classification to those goals. See
J. NowAKc, R. ROTUNDA & J: YOUNG, CONsTrriroNAL LAW 590 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited
as NOWAK].
15. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring) (striking down a
Texas statute denying free public education to illegal aliens).
16. "Traditionally" refers to the Warren Court era (1953-1968) during which the two-tier
system of review emerged. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has
undergone dramatic transformation in recent decades. Prior to the 1950's, in the absence of
race discrimination, the Court interpreted the equal protection guarantee as imposing only a
minimal restraint on the government's ability to use classifications in awarding benefits or
imposing burdens. The review of government action under the clause was so restrained dur-
ing this period that Justice Holmes referred to equal protection as "the usual last resort of
constitutional arguments." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). But during the Warren
era, especially in the 1960's, the equal protection guarantee became a prime tool for over-
turning legislation. See G. GUNTHER, CONsTrruTIoNAL LAW CASES & MATRALs 670-71 (10th
ed. 1980).
17. "Standard of review," as a term of art, refers to the constitutional analysis by the
judiciary, consisting of an examination of the relationship between the legislative purpose
asserted and the statutory classification created.
18. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961) (In rejecting a claim that the
exemptions of certain businesses from the Maryland Sunday closing law violated equal pro-
tection, a unanimous Court declared that, under the rational basis test, equal protection is
violated only by classifications that are wholly arbitrary and bear no reasonable relation to
any legitimate governmental purpose.).
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Supreme Court defers to the legislature's choice of goals and its determi-
nation of whether the classification relates to those goals.19 The second
and more rigorous standard of review, strict scrutiny, requires the govern-
ment to demonstrate that the classification is necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest.20 A compelling state interest has been
described as one of so great a value as to justify the limitation of a funda-
mental constitutional value.21 The Court employs this strict standard
whenever the challenged legislation sufficiently impairs a fundamental
right 22 or is based upon an inherently suspect classification.23 The appli-
cation of a strict standard of judicial review is almost always fatal to the
legislation being tested.24
Some members of the Supreme Court have indicated dissatisfaction
with the inflexibility of this two-tiered analysis.25 The Court has recently
19. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (New York law restrict-
ing type of methods used in pumping mineral wastes withstood due process challenge. Using
the rational basis test, the Court stated that legislatures are presumed to have acted ration-
ally, so that classifications are to be set aside only when a court finds no conceivable basis
for the clasification.). See also Fox, Equal Protection Analysis: Laurence Tribe, The Middle
Tier, and the Role of the Court, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 525, 526 n.3 (1980). But see United States
Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (the Court invoked the due process
clause of the fifth amendment to strike down a classification which allowed only households
whose members were all related to one another to receive food stamps).
20. NowAK, supra note 14, at 524-25. In practice the courts have been reluctant to find an
adequate compelling government justification for suspect classifications, i.e., those groups of
individuals who share an immutable characteristic which is irrelevant to the ability of each
individual within the group. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. See Gunther, The
Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
21. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Supreme Court applied strict
scrutiny to statute which used different criteria for ability of servicemen and service women
to claim spouses as dependents).
22. The Court considers a right to be fundamental only if the right is explicitly or implic-
itly guaranteed by the Constitution. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 33 (1973) (education not found to be among rights explicitly protected by Consitu-
tion). In addition to those rights explicitly identified in the Constitution, the Court has
found other implicit fundamental rights: the right to marry, see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 383 (1978); the right to vote, see Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621,
626 (1969); the right to interstate travel, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30
(1969); the right to freedom of association, see William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968).
23. The Court has recognized only three classifications as suspect: alienage, Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (state statute that denied welfare benefits to aliens
violated equal protection clause); race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (state stat-
ute that prohibited mariage between people of different races violated equal protection
clause); and national origin, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[A]U
legal restraints which curtain civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.").
24. Only in Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214, has explicit discrimination against a suspect class
been upheld after application of strict scrutiny.
25. Gunther, supra note 20, at 17. The two-tiered approach has been criticized as too
rigid and mechanistic because it permits only two widely variant levels of scrutiny without
protecting those rights which are between the rational and strict standard of review. See,
[Vol. 19:389
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retreated from the rigid two-tiered test by creating an intermediate level
of review. 26 Even though a majority of the Court refuses to expressly 7
adopt the intermediate standard, it has in reality applied such a standard
under the guise of a minimum rationality test.2 Numerous phrases have
been used to describe the intermediate level of scrutiny.29 The most com-
mon definition requires that the challenged classification be substantially
related to an important state interest.30 Under the intermediate standard
of judicial review, the state must produce credible evidence demonstrat-
ing a substantial relationship between the statutory classification and the
statutory goal.3 1 This new middle-tier approach allows the court to avoid
finding a particular classification totally prohibited, or conversely, com-
pletely under legislative control. Such an approach indicates a major re-
e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26. Seeburger, The Muddle of the Middle Tier: The Coming Crisis in Equal Protection,
48 Mo. L. REV. 587, 614 (1983).
27. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (plurality opinion), a majority of the Court de-
parted from the traditional equal protection analysis and applied an intermediate standard
of review. The majority opinion did not convincingly explain, however, why the standard
was appropriate, nor did it adhere to the traditional definition of intermediate review. Id. at
218-23. In addition, the opinion did not explicitly use the words "sensitive" or "quasi-
suspect."
28. NowAK, supra note 14, at 595; Comment, Intermediate Equal Protection Scrutiny of
Welfare Laws that Deny Subsistence, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1547, 1551-52 (1984). A majority of
the current Supreme Court has refused to openly retreat from the bifurcated analysis for
fear that this would usurp the legislative function. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 31. However,
in several instances the Court has used some form of intermediate scrutiny by refusing to
blindly accept the interest asserted by the state and by testing the proffered state interest
through independent analysis. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Massachu-
setts statute that prohibited distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons was struck
down because it was deemed to be only marginally related to the proferred objective.)
29. For an extensive list of phrases used by the Supreme Court in the intermediate stan-
dard of review, see Comment, Suspect Classifications: A Suspect Analysis, 87 Dim L. REv.
407, 409 n.17 (1983).
30. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976)). The Califano court recognized the important government objective in les-
sening the disparity in economic conditions between the sexes, which had been caused by a
long pattern of discrimination against women. Section 215 of the Social Security Act, which
provided a higher level of monthly old-age benefits for retired female wage earners than for
otherwise similarly situated male wage earners, was found to be substantially related to this
objective.
The level of scrutiny involved and the intensity of the interests necessary to meet the test
are still undetermined. It appears that intermediate scrutiny does not occupy any fixed
point between rational basis analysis and strict scrutiny, but rather, changes according to
the importance of the interest involved and the degree of the infringement on individual
rights. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 209.
31. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 209; cf. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979) (rejecting a
challenge to a statute requiring mandatory retirement of Foreign Service personnel at age
sixty; applying a rationality standard and stating that a statutory classification that has any
conceivable rational basis will pass equal protection analysis, even though the state never
produces evidence supporting the classification).
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treat from the all or nothing approach of the traditional rational basis-
judicial deference and strict scrutiny-judicial invalidation dichotomy. A
middle tier of review may allow interventionism on the part of the Court,
because it can independently assess the relationship of the classification
to the goal.
B. Judicial Attempts to Define a Quasi-Suspect Class
Although the majority of the Supreme Court has not explicitly recog-
nized the existence of a quasi-suspect class,32 past decisions indicate that
intermediate scrutiny will be applied to those classes which are comprised
of certain distinguishing characteristics.3 3 The characteristics which iden-
tify a class as quasi-suspect can be determined through an analysis of
those classes which have been afforded the status of suspect and quasi-
suspect.
1. Determining Suspectness
The Court presently recognizes the classifications of race, alienage, and
national origin as suspect.34 Traditionally, three characteristics have been
considered in the determination of whether a class should be accorded
suspect status.3 5 First, the Court determines if the class has suffered a
history of discrimination.3 6 In evaluating this factor, the Court focuses on
whether the resulting discrimination has created a discrete and insular
minority which has been inhibited from participating in the political pro-
32. "Quasi-suspect" classes (sensitive classes) are those subject to an intermediate level of
review under the equal protection clause.
33. The Court presently applies de facto intermediate scrutiny to laws which employ gen-
der and illegitimacy classifications, giving rise to an unarticulated quasi-suspect classifica-
tion. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
34. See supra note 23.
35. Many commentators stress the fact that the Supreme Court has never clearly articu-
lated the criteria for determining suspectness. See, e.g., Comment, Mental Illness: A Sus-
pect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1241 (1974) ("The Supreme Court has indicated with
varying degrees of explicitness that certain classifications are or are not suspect. It has not,
however, articulated the criteria used in deciding whether or not a classification is suspect.")
(footnotes omitted). Thus, these three factors are not as well-defined as one might believe.
However, numerous commentators have acknowledged the Court's reliance upon these fac-
tors in their analysis of whether a class is suspect. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 28, at
1552. The present list is by no means limited. See Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws, 37 CALns. L. REV. 341, 356 (1949) ("[A suspect class'] contents, at any
particular time, will depend upon the area in which the principle of equality is struggling
against the recurring forms of claims to special and unequal status. .. ").
36. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) ("[C]entral purpose of Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the
States.").
394 [Vol. 19:389
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cess.3 7 If such discrimination has occurred, judicial intervention is deemed
to be justified to correct the failures of the legislative process.38
Second, the Court considers whether the class has been repeatedly dis-
advantaged or stigmatized.39 The concern of the Court is whether the
classification of the group in and of itself creates a societal and individual
reaction of inferiority and degradation. 40
Third, the Court determines whether the classification is based upon
traits which are unchangeable or immutable.41 The focus on immutability
is based upon the underlying principle that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.42
In addition to these three traditional characteristics of suspectness, the
Court has also indicated two elements which may enter into the determi-
nation of suspect status. In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia,43 the Court, rejecting age as a suspect class, stated that a suspect
class should be "unique" and based on "stereo-typed characteristics not
truly indicative of [the class's] abilities." 4 In Mathews v. Lucas,45 the
37. This criteria of suspectness is derived from Justice Stone's footnote in United States
v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorites, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
38. For example, a class, while able to vote, may still be an "outside group," and in need
of judicial intervention. Blacks can vote but may still be effectively excluded from the politi-
cal process without certain judicial correction. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Com-
ment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YmLE L.J. 920, 933 n.85 (1973) (explanation of the failures of the
legislative process in protecting minorities).
39. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(any statute which stigmatizes is an unconstitutional violation of equal protection) (dictum).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (sex
should be a suspect classification in part because it is an "immutable characteristic deter-
mined solely by the accident of birth"); but see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (refusing to extend strict scrutiny to a large, diverse and amor-
phous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have
less taxable wealth than other districts).
42. See supra note 13. However, the importance of immutability as a characteristic of
suspectness should not be over-emphasized because alienage, which is a suspect class, is not
an immutable characteristic.
43. 427 U.S. 307 (1976). In Murgia, the Court ruled that a state statute mandating retire-
ment for uniformed state police officers at age 50, did not violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The Court based its holding on two factors. First, testimony
clearly established that the risk of physical failure increases with age so that mandatory
retirement at age 50 serves to remove from the force those whose fitness for police work has
presumptively diminished with age. Discrimination was based, therefore, on a characteristic,
i.e., age, that was, in fact, indicative of ability. Second, old age does not comprise a unique
group because persumably all people will eventually belong to that group.
44. Id. at 313. The Court also rejected the elderly as a suspect class because it was not a
discrete and insular group. Id.
1985]
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Court rejected illegitimacy as a suspect class, stressing the additional re-
quirement of degree or severity of the past discrimination. Justice Black-
mun, drawing upon the definition of a suspect class set out in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,46 indicated that a
suspect class must also be characterized by an "obvious badge" which is
evidenced by a history of severe and pervasive legal and political
discrimination.
4 7
2. Determining Quasi-Suspectness
The Court has extended quasi-suspect status to classifications based
upon gender 8 and illegitimacy.49 The Court is unclear as to how many of
the suspect characteristics a class must possess in order to be afforded
quasi-suspect status.5 0 Determination of whether a classification is quasi-
suspect, however, will likely depend upon whether the class shares at
least some of the indicia of suspectness.51
45. 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (upholding a provision of the Social Security Act which imposed a
more stringent burden of proving dependency for death benefits on some classes of illegiti-
mate children).
46. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding under mere rational scrutiny a property tax system
which favored the school aged children of the more affluent, because the system was not
shown to discriminate against any definable class of poor people); see infra note 50.
47. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506.
48. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Craig, the Court ruled that an
Oklahoma statute which prohibited the sale of beer to females under the age of eighteen
and to males under the age of twenty-one constituted an invidious discrimination against
males eighteen to twenty years of age, in violation of the equal protection clause. In its
decision, a majority of the Court held that gender classification must be substantially re-
lated to an important state interest, and therefore treated gender as a quasi-suspect class.
Id. at 204-10.
49. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (treating illegitimacy as de facto
quasi-suspect by holding that a shorter time period for illegitimate children to bring suit
was not substantially related to the legitimate goal of preventing fraudulent claims).
50. Commentators themselves do not agree on this point. Compare J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DisTRusT 250 n.64 (1980) (suggesting the presence of one of the indicia of suspectness
may not indicate a reason for extreme judicial solicitude, but a combination of several fac-
tors makes a significant argument for protection of the group) with Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A
History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect
Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855, 906 (1975) ("[a]
class may thus establish its eligibility for suspectness by qualifying under any one of these
three criteria") (referring to San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973), stating that strict scrutiny will apply to those groups which are "saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection for the
majoritarian political process") (emphasis added).
51. For example, gender and illegitimacy share many of the same criteria which charac-
terize racial classifications. Both gender and illegitimacy are similar to race in that the af-
fected person has no more control over his birth status or sex than the black man has over
the color of his skin. Sex, like race and national origin, is a visible and immutable biological
characteristic that bears no necessary relation to ability. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
[Vol. 19:389
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In Plyler v. Doe 2 the Supreme Court broadened the boundaries of in-
termediate scrutiny. The majority opinion by Justice Brennan refused to
recognize illegal aliens as a suspect class.53 However, a heightened form of
scrutiny was applied because the class shared some of the characteristics
of suspectness, and more significantly, the class was denied an important
governmental benefit.14 Thus, Plyer indicates that the Court's identifica-
tion of an important individual or societal interest in its equal protection
analysis will broaden the scope of intermediate scrutiny.5
H. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne5 6 -CREATION OF A
QUASI-SUSPECT CLASS
Cleburne Living Centers, Inc. (CLC) acquired property within the city
of Cleburne, Texas for the operation of a group home, classified as a level
one intermediate care facility. It was planned that the facility would
house thirteen mildly retarded men and women who would be provided
jobs in the community and in a work activity center. The residents would
receive twenty-four hour supervision from CLC staff members who would
handle the cooking, cleaning, and teach the mentally retarded such skills
as "kitchen management, maintenance, personal budgeting, meat prepa-
ration, academics related to independent learning (such as how to read
677, 686 (1973). However, neither gender nor illegitimacy contains all of the elements of
suspectness. See J. BARRON & C. DIENS, CONSTrrUMONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICY 603
(1982) (legislation affecting women does not impose stigma of inferiority); see also Mathews
v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) ("illegitimacy does not carry an obvious badge as race and
sex do"). Therefore, even though gender and illegitimacy do not contain all of the indicia of
suspectness, they do contain enough in the proper degree to trigger intermediate review.
52. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
53. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (the status of being an illegal alien is not "an absolutely immu-
table characteristic since it is the product of conscious, indeed unlawful, action"). Note,
however, that legal aliens are afforded suspect status. See supra note 23."
54. Id. at 218-22. This is the first indication that intermediate scrutiny is a sliding scale
rather than a rigid point between rationality and strict scrutiny. The important benefit at
stake in Plyler was education. Education is deemed an important interest because it affects
the person's ability to function in society and its lack deprives the individual of any oppor-
tunity to advance personal or economic interests on the basis of individual merit. Id.
55. The Court's recognition of an important individual or societal interest in its equal
protection analysis is significant. Even in those circumstances where the class alone does not
contain enough of the characteristics of suspectness to trigger intermediate scrutiny, the
Court may take into consideration the existence of an "important interest" which would be
denied without the Court's judicial protection. The Court, in essence, combines those sus-
pect criteria which do exist with the important interest at stake in order to justify the use of
an intermediate form of scrutiny. The dissenting Justices, Burger, White, Rehnquist and
O'Connor, denounce the use of an "important interest" in the equal protection analysis.
"Once it is conceded-as the Court does-that illegal aliens are not a suspect class, and that
education is not a fundamental right, our inquiry should focus on and be limited to whether
the legislative classification at issue bears a rational relationship to a legitimate purpose."
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 247-49.
56. 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984).
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classified advertisements for jobs and housing), and the use and enjoy-
ment of leisure time activities." 57
The local law applicable to the CLC project is section 8 of the city of
Cleburne's zoning ordinance, which controls the developmental use of the
property. Although the zoning ordinance permits property purchased
within zone R-3 to be used for hospitals, sanitariums, and nursing homes,
it requires that a special use permit be obtained from the Cleburne City
Council for a hospital for the insane or feeble-minded. CLC applied for a
special use permit but the City Council denied its request. After exhaust-
ing administrative remedies, CLC brought suit challenging the ordinance
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."
In addressing this equal protection claim, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that the mentally retarded constitute a quasi-suspect
class requiring an intermediate level of scrutiny.5 Because the city failed
to prove that the ordinance substantially furthers a significant govern-
mental interest, the court held that the ordinance violated the equal pro-
tection clause.60 The court's finding that the mentally retarded constitute
a quasi-suspect class was based upon the premise that the mentally re-
tarded share enough of the characteristics of suspectness to warrant
heightened scrutiny.6' The following analysis will consider the justifica-
tions offered by the court for giving judicially protected status to the
mentally retarded.
A. Mentally Retarded: A Suspect Class?
The standard of strict scrutiny was rejected in Cleburne Living Center
because, the court held, this standard is reserved for classifications such
as race, which are irrelevant to any proper legislative goal. 2 The court
stated that the classification of mental retardation is irrelevant to many
policies, but noted that in some instances, a classification based upon
57. Id. at 194.
58. The basis of the equal protection claim is that the ordinance discriminates against the
mentally retarded by requiring them to first obtain a special use permit before living in the
home. Id.
59. Id. at 193.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 198. Note that the issue of whether the mentally retarded should be regarded as
a quasi-suspect class is one of first impression. Thus, the court in Cleburne Living Center
was guided by other equal protection decisions up to this point, rather than case law dealing
specifically with the mentally retarded. "Although some district courts have discussed this
issue, we can find no appellate opinions directly deciding the proper characterization of
mentally retarded persons for Equal Protection analysis. Therefore, we face the issue as one
of first impression." Id. at 196.
62. 726 F.2d 191, 198 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17, n.14
(1982)).
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mental retardation is a relevant distinction. 3
There are several reasons for concluding that the court was correct in
rejecting strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review. First, the
court's rationale is in accordance with Justice Brennan's plurality opinion
in Frontiero v. Richardson, in which a statute discriminating between the
sexes was held to be unconstitutional." According to Frontiero, the Court
applies heightened scrutiny to protect those classes whose characteristics
bear no relation to their ability to contribute to society.6 5 It is clear that
the mentally retarded's characteristics do have a direct relation to their
ability to contribute and perform. 6 Therefore, the mentally retarded, ai a
class, fail to satisfy this characteristic of suspectness.
Furthermore, the present trend of Supreme Court decisions supports
the court's rationale rejecting strict scrutiny as a standard of review.6 7 In
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court indi-
cated a reluctance to expand the range of suspect classifications beyond
those already recognized.68
Finally, the characteristic of mental retardation is not an immutable,
inherited trait and, therefore, should not qualify for strict scrutiny.6 9 A
suspect class is one characterized by an immutable characteristic deter-
63. For example, the court noted that learning difficulties may have an impact upon the
types of school programs to which a child is assigned or the types of employment for which
an adult is qualified. Id.
64. 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). "[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as
intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect crieteria, is that
the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society." Since Frontiero, the Supreme Court has retreated from its identification of sex as a
suspect class. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
65. Both the present suspect classes-race, alienage, national origin, and the present
quasi-suspect classes-illegitimacy and gender, are defined by characteristics which bear no
relation to their ability to contribute and perform. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
505 (1976) ("[Tlhe legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or national
origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate indi-
vidual, and it bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to
society."). Since this element appears to be a common thread throughout the determination
of both suspect and quasi-suspect status, it most likely will be given a greater degree of
weight in the equal protection analysis.
66. Burt, Beyond the Right to Habilitation, in PPnsmnr's CoMMrrr, supra note 2, at
428 (differences between blacks and whites are purely social, whereas differences between
many mentally retarded persons and other persons reflect true differences in endowment
and potential).
67. Suspect classifications have become closed categories during the tenure of the Burger
Court. J. BARRON & C. DIENS, supra note 51, at 475.
68. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (refusing to recognize poor people as a suspect class).
69. The Cleburne Living Center court relied on expert testimony in finding that mental
retardation is irreversible and, therefore, immutable. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at
198. However, empirical evidence exists that contradicts this finding.
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mined solely by the accident of birth.70 Although the majority of mentally
retarded individuals have been retarded since birth,7 1 mental retardation
does not occur exclusively through congenital birth defects. 72 Therefore,
mental retardation is not a characteristic determined solely by the acci-
dent of birth. Also, some forms of mental retardation are not immuta-
ble.7 3 In the case of the mildly retarded, whose condition has been caused
by circumstances of poverty, lack of developmental stimulation, and dif-
fering cultural values,7 4 recent studies have indicated that improvement
and stimulation of the environment increase the intelligence of such indi-
viduals, changing their legal status.7 5 In addition, social perceptions76 and
clinical techniques of identification 7 can affect whether an individual is
labeled mentally retarded. Thus, a change in either clinical definition or
social perception can alter the individual's legal status.7
B. Mentally Retarded: A Quasi Suspect Class?
In Cleburne Living Center, the court found that the mentally retarded
70. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
71. See C. BARLOW, MENTAL RETARDATION AND RELATED DISORDERS 3 (1978).
72. Accidents and diseases incurred during life may result in brain damage and impair-
ment of the mental process. See Kramer, The Right Not to Be Mentally Retarded, in PRS-
WENT'S CoMMITrE, supra note 2, at 31-38; see also Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 192
n.2. ("[Mental retardation's] onset is sometimes from birth or during childhood.") (empha-
sis added).
73. But see Comment, Zoning the Mentally Retarded Into Single-Family Residential
Areas: A Grape of Wrath or the Fermentation of Wisdom, 385 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 385, 401 n.109
(1979) ("[Although] the mentally retarded as a class may not fall within the phrase 'immu-
table inherited characteristics'. . . this... should bear no import upon the mentally re-
tarded as a suspect class. The mentally retarded still suffer from an immutable trait that
sets them apart from society and brands them as deviants.").
74. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: THE
KNOWN AND THE UNKNOWN 36 (1976).
75. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: PAST
AND PRESENT 145 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PAST & PRESENT] ("Epidemiological studies
have consistently shown a 'disappearance' of mildly retarded persons in the adult years.") In
Cleburne Living Center, the court identifies this as mere amelioration. It states, however,
that a significant improvement in condition can remove the individual from the class of the
mentally retarded. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 198.
76. A person is labeled mentally retarded when he is not able to conform to the intellec-
tual and adaptive standards set by society. PAST & PRESENT, supra note 75, at 147.
77. "Mental retardation, as an inclusive concept, is currently defined in behavioral terms
involving these essential components: intellectual functioning, adaptive behavior and age of
onset.... Within this broad functional definition, the deficits indicated in a diagnosis of
mental retardation may or may not be permanent and irreversible." Id. at 147. (emphasis
added).
78. For example, in 1973 the American Association on Mental Deficiency lowered the
boundary lines of mental retardation by two standard deviations, thereby abolishing the
classification of borderline mental retardation. Therefore, millions of American citizens were
relieved of the burden of being presumed mentally retarded. Dybwad, Beyond the Right to
Habilitation, in PRESIDENT'S CoMMrrrEE, supra note 2, at 439.
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share enough characteristics of suspectness to warrant heightened scru-
tiny.7 ' The court stated that the mentally retarded historically have been
the subject of unfair and grotesque mistreatment, 0 and have been ex-
cluded from the political process."1
There is ample reason for finding that the mentally retarded have ex-
perienced a history of unequal treatment.8 2 Although the term "mentally
retarded" denotes a group of people who have the common characteristic
of below average intellectual functioning,"' this classification does not
mean that all of those individuals are similar in all areas of their func-
tioning.8 This misconception has created a history of severe and perva-
sive discriminations against the mentally retarded.88
In addition to finding a history of mistreatment, the court contended
that the mentally retarded are a discrete and insular minority.8 7 It is
clear that the mentally retarded are a discrete minority because they have
been rendered politically powerless by statutes in many jurisdictions. 8
79. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 1984). The
court includes the existence of immutabilty in its finding that the mentally retarded are a
quasi-suspect class, but this contention may not be in accordance with existing precedent.
See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text. The nonexistence of immutability, however,
does not prevent the application of heightened scrutiny. See supra note 42.
80. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 197 (citing O'Hara & Sanks, Eugenic Steriliza-
tion, 45 GEO. L.J. 30 (1956)). The court states that the mentally retarded have been univer-
sally denied admittance to public schools. In addition, euthanasia and compulsory steriliza-
tion were common practices during the first half of the century. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200 (1927) (upholding Virginia compulsory sterilizaton law).
81. The court finds that most states disqualify the mentally retarded from voting and
few political organizations exist to represent the mentally retarded. Cleburne Living Center,
726 F.2d at 197.
82. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
83. See C. TELFORD & J. SAWREY, THE EXCEPTIONAL INnimuAL 247 (1977).
84. The variance among mentally retarded persons in their intellectual functioning and
adaptive behavior has led the American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD) to sub-
divide the mentally retarded into four classifications: borderline, mild (educable), moderate
(trainable), and severe and profound (totally dependent). Id. at 163. The gap of intelligence
between the profoundly retarded and the mildly retarded is greater than the gap between
the mildly retarded and the normal person. Id. The mild and moderate classifications com-
promise approximately 95 percent of the entire retarded population. Id. at 220-21.
85. In addition to the examples given by the court, see supra notes 80-81, most states
proscribe marriage where one of the parties is mentally retarded. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 402.020(1) (Baldwin 1970). A number of states prohibit mentally retarded people
from entering into contracts. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 13-3-24 (1982).
86. "A group of persons labeled 'mentally retarded' in this society has been subjected to
discrimination as brutal and dehumanizing as were imposed on the slave population." Burt,
supra note 66, at 426.
87. See Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 163 n.35 (3d Cir. 1982) (dictum) ("the men-
tally retarded may well be a paradigmatic example of a discrete and insular minority for
whom the judiciary should exercise special solicitude"), vacated and remanded, 457 U.S.
307 (1982).
88. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-2, -338 (Repl. Vol. 1984) (disqualifying the mentally
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However, the existence of surrogate voices for the mentally retarded may
affect the requirement of insularity. In Association for Retarded Citizens
of North Dakota v. Olson, 9 it was held that the mentally retarded are no
longer a politically powerless group because their interests now are repre-
sented in the political process.90 There are presently four major political
organizations which play a prominent role in protecting the rights of the
mentally retarded,9 1 but whether the existence of these organizations will
disqualify the mentally retarded as a insular minority is unknown.92 Their
presence does represent a significant factor in determining whether the
mentally retarded are being excluded from the political process.
The presence of a stigma is another characteristic of suspectness which
can trigger intermediate scrutiny,93 however, the court in Cleburne Living
Center fails to consider this aspect in its equal protection analysis.9 4 The
classification of an individual as mentally retarded is generally believed to
have a stigmatizing affect which "generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone." 95
C. Mentally Retarded: Denial of Important Benefits
Intermediate scrutiny as a standard of review may be applicable even
though the particular class does not contain a sufficient number or degree
retarded from jury service); WIs. CONsT. art. 3, § 2 (disqualifying the mentally retarded from
voting).
89. 561 F. Supp. 473, 490 (D.N.D. 1982) (holding that the mentally retarded should be
reviewed under intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny because the mentally re-
tarded are not a politically powerless group; furthermore, the characteristics of mentally
retarded persons are often indicative of their true ability).
90. Id. at 490 ("This fact is evidenced by the sweeping legal reforms concerning the rights
of the mentally retarded that have occurred in nearly every state as well as by the enact-
ments of federal legislation aimed at improving the conditions of the handicapped.").
91. The American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD), the Council for Excep-
tional Children (CEC), the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation, and the National Associa-
tion for Retarded Citizens (NARC). PAST & PRESENT, supra note 75, at 63.
92. Effective representation of the mentally retarded by a political organization is the key
to determining whether the organization will cause the mentally retarded to be disqualified
as an insular minority. The Cleburne Living Center court discredits the importance of polit-
ical organizations by suggesting that they have little power. Cleburne Living Center, 726
F.2d at 198. Although the total impact is hard to determine, it is clear that the organizations
are a growing force.
93. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
94. The court relies only upon the combination of historical prejudice, political powerless-
ness, and lack of immutability to justify intermediate scrutiny. Cleburne Living Center, 726
F.2d at 198.
95. Burt, supra note 66, at 429; see also Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 293-95 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (noting the stigma which our society
attaches to the label of mental retardation).
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of suspect criteria. 6 The court in Cleburne Living Center, relying upon
the decision in Plyler v. Doe,97 justifies the use of intermediate scrutiny
by stating that the Cleburne ordinance withholds from the mentally re-
tarded the important governmental benefit of group home living.9 8 In
Plyler, education was deemed an important benefit because it affected
the person's ability to function in society; without an education, the indi-
vidual was deprived of the opportunity to advance.99 Similarly, group
home living for the mentally retarded is necessary to implement the the-
ory of normalization, which will enable the individual to develop to his
full potential. 100 Because group home living is necessary to the develop-
ment and improvement of mentally retarded individuals, its denial, cou-
pled with those suspect criteria which characterize the mentally retarded,
should trigger intermediate scrutiny.
IH. CONCLUSION
The term "mentally retarded" covers a diverse group of people who
vary enormously in talent, personality, and aptitude. The laws and per-
ceptions of our society, however, evidence a misconception concerning the
heterogeneity of this group. Although there is a small group of mentally
retarded people who will never be capable of a meaningful existence
outside an institutional setting, the vast majority of the mentally retarded
are capable of functioning within society.
The present trend towards reintegration of the mentally retarded into
society has been hindered by prejudicial and archaic laws. Equal protec-
tion of the law requires that those who are similarly situated not be
treated differently. Although classification alone does not deprive a group
of equal protection, laws which incorrectly classify and burden individu-
als do infringe upon their constitutional rights. It is legally impermissible
to treat the mildly and moderately retarded persons in a manner similar
to the profoundly and severely retarded; the capacity of each person
should be judged individually before that person is denied civil and legal
rights.
An increased form of judicial scrutiny is required to successfully chal-
lenge laws which misclassify and unduly burden the mentally retarded.
Because classifications based upon mental retardation are sometimes an
irrelevant distinction, a heightened form of scrutiny is justified. On the
other hand, the uncertainty as to whether mental retardation is abso-
lutely immutable, and the presence of surrogate voices, weigh against the
96. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
97. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
98. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 199 (5th Cir. 1984).
99. See supra note 54.
100. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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use of strict scrutiny. An intermediate standard would accord to the judi-
ciary the flexibility to invalidate those laws which are not based upon
relevant distinctions.
The Supreme Court has not indicated the proper degree or number of
suspect criteria required to trigger an intermediate standard of review.
The Court should consider whether the mentally retarded through their
surrogate representation will be able to use the legislative process to over-
come the stereotypes connected with the label "mentally retarded." Since
it is unlikely that the present legislative representation alone will give
adequate protection, judicial protection should be afforded to the men-
tally retarded.
Dale W. Webb
